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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
devised his property to his second wife and children, and included
only one of his first wife's children. To the children of the first
wife he gave one dollar each. The court held "The testator has here
clearly shown, by necessary implication, his intention to give all his
property to his children by his last wife, as a class." The court
further stated that this implication need not be absolutely irre-
sistible but only such as satisfies the mind of the court of the inten-
tion of the testator. Apparently in the principal case, the mind
of the court was not satisfied as to the intention, even though the
plaintiffs in this case were children of the testator's first wife, to
whom he had bequeathed one dollar each. It would seem that the
real intent of the testator was to exclude his first children from his
property, which could have been made effective by the court's
application of the presumption against intestacy.18
However, the court does not necessarily pursue the real or
true intent of the testator. "In interpretation of a will, the true
inquiry is not what the testator meant to express, but what do the
words used express." 19  "It is not, what did he mean? but it is,
what do his words mean? "20 Thus, the court may have rested the
decision on what they considered to be the apparent or indicated
intent of the testator, to limit his devise to the three certain tracts
of 109 acres. Had the real. intent as evidenced by the tenor of the
instrument and the whole scheme of the testator's devise and be-
quests been given effect, as was done in the Runyon case, then a
contrary result might have been reached.2
J. S. M.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - F IING APPLICATION WITHIN
STATUTORY PERIOD. - Claimant was injured and four months later
the employer reported the injury to the state compensation commis-
sioner. Thereafter upon receipt of application forms from the
commissioner and within six months from the date of injury,
claimant went to the office of his employer, made out and signed
the application for compensation, leaving it there with the ex-
pectation that it would be promptly forwarded to the commissioner.
is" .... where two modes of interpretation are possible, that is preferred
which will prevent either total or partial intestacy", Honaker v. Starks, 114
Va. 37, 39, 57 S. E. 741 (1912). To the same effect, Carney v. Kain, 40 W.
Va. 758, 23 S. E. 650 (1895); (1921) 28 R. C. L. 227.
10 Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 304, 313, 27 S. E. 389 (1897), quoting from
Couch v. Eastham, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S. E. 23 (1887).
20 Coberly v. Earle, 60 V. Va. 295, 302, 54 S. E. 336 (1906)L
211 HARRSON, WILLs & ADMmSTRATION (2d ed. 1927) 380, § 193 (2).
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Inadvertently, the application was not filed until more than six
months after the date of injury. Compensation was denied, and
upon appeal the workmen's compensation appeal board affirmed
the action of the commissioner. From this ruling an appeal was
allowed by the supreme court. Held, two judges dissenting, that the
filing of an application for compensation in the office of the em-
ployer of the claimant in the belief, or expectation that it would be
forwarded to the compensation commissioner within the six
months' period provided by statute, was not a filing thereof in
the office of the commissioner within the meaning of the Code.
Young v. State Compensation Commissioner.'
Courts have generally recognized that workmen's compensa-
tion acts are remedial, and as such should be liberally construed,2
but certain provisions thereof are incapable of being interpreted
other than strictly,3 for their limitations are inherent. Such a
provision is the requirement of the statute that all claims be filed
in the office of the compensation commissioner within six months
from the date of injury.4 The view taken in the majority of juris-
dictions is that the act creates a new right, that in establishing this
right time has been made of the essence, and that fulfilment of this
requirement is precedent to and is an essential ingredient of the
right.' This provision is mandatory and jurisdictional," and thus
1 3 S. E. (2d) 517 (W. Va. 1939). The decision in this case governed the
holding in Pridgen v. Compensation Comm'r, 3 S. E. (2d) 522 (W. Va. 1939),
in which case the application for compensation was not verified until after the
expiration of the six months' period, and was not filed within that period.
There was no dissent.
2 IThe Workmen's Compensation Act, being remedial, should not be strictly
construed, but a spirit of liberality should be employed in its interpretation."
Caldwell v. Compensation Comm'r, 106 W. Va. 14, 18, 144 S. E. 568 (1928).
3 " It is not our duty either to justify or criticize the provisions of com-
pensation statutes, but merely to construe them .... liberal construction does
not imply strained construction." Wood Coal Co. v. Compensation Comm'r,
119 W. Va. 581, 583, 195 S. E. 528 (1938). "Save only as ex-pressly modified
by the proviso the six months' limitation must be respected and applied by the
commissioner and this court. Neither has authority to enlarge the proviso by
liberal construction or otherwise." Moorefield v. Compensation Comm'r, 112
W. Va. 229, 230, 164 S. E. 26 (1932).
4 W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 23, art. 4, § 15.
r Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251, 150 S. E. 78 (1929); Kannellos v. Great
Northern Ry., 151 Minn. 157, 186 N. W. 389 (1922); Bement v. Grand Rapids
& I. Ry., 194 Mich. 64, 160 N. W. 424 (1916).
0 2 SCHNEIDER, WOR EN'S COMkfPENSATI N (2d ed. 1932) § 545. In Note
(1932) 78 A. L. R. 1294, it is said that most jurisdictions hold that limitation
of time for filing claim under act is jurisdictional and condition precedent to
right to maintain an action thereunder - but that several states support the
view that limitations of time for filing claim is not jurisdictional, but merely
directory, and a matter of defense which may or may not be raised. 0 'Esau
v. Bliss Co., 188 App. Div. 385, 177 N. Y. Supp. 203 (1919) (is not properly
2
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where the terms of the statute are plain, unambiguous, and cer-
tain, the statute speaks for itself. Nothing can be added to it, and
nothing can be omitted,7 though an exception is made where a
treaty with a foreign country is involved, for being part of the
supreme law of the land it supersedes state statutory provisions.8
The doctrine of liberal construction may be applied in determining
whether there has been a compliance with the statute.
The statute specifically requires that to entitle an employee to
compensation his application must be "filed in the office of com-
missioner". No provision is made for an alternative place of filing;
and a filing with the employer will not prevent the statute from
running against such claim.10 The employer has not been made an
agent of the commissioner so that an application filed with him will
satisfy the statutory provision, but has been required only to have a
supply of application blanks available. If there is any possibility
of an agency relationship existing under the facts of the instant
case, it would seem more reasonable to assume that the employer
became an agent of the employee,"' and as such might be liable
for a failure to perform, but this would not alter the effect of a
noncompliance with the statutory requirement.
It must be recognized that there does not appear in the princi-
pal case any clear proof of fraud. But even where fraud has been
established, some jurisdictions hold that the statute is not tolled."
a statute of limitations but a condition on a right); Levangie 's Case, 228 Mass.
213, 117 N. E. 200 (1917) (board is not a court of general or limited common
law - but an administrative body, and possesses only such authority and power
as has been bonfdrred by express grant).
7Chmielewska v. Butte & S. Mining Co., 81 Mont. 36, 261 Pac. 616 (1927).
8 Papadaki v. Compensation Comm'r, 111 W. Va. 15, 160 S. B. 224 (1931) ;
Urbus v. Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 563, 169 S. E. 164 (1933). These
cases involved treaties governing the prompt transmission of information
in case of death and no known heirs.
9 Culurides v. Ott. 78 W. Va. 696, 90 S. E. 270 (1916). A claim was filed
but was signed by a brother of the deceased instead of his widow. It was held
to be a filing within the meaning of the statute.
20 State v. Industrial Comm'n, 123 Ohio St. 86, 174 X. E. 11 (1930).
11" .... if the principal requests another to act for him with respect to a
matter, and indicates that the other is to act without further communication
and the other consents so to act, the relationship of principal and agent exists.II
RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 15 (Comment b). 1 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d
ed. 1914) § 26.
12 Claimant was induced by his employer not to file a claim on the promise
that he would be given employment for life. As soon as the period for filing
had elapsed, the employee was fired, and action for compensation was brought.
Claim dismissed because of failure to file within designated period. The court
said: "If it were merely a statute of limitations, we have no doubt that the
defendant would be estopped from setting up the failure of the plaintiff to
bring his action within two years by reason of its agreement with him ....
The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of
3
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If, under the West Virginia statute, the requirement as to time for
filing is mandatory and jurisdictional even in the presence of
fraud, the claimant would be deprived of his right to compensation
and be left to an uncertain action against his employer. It is sub-
mitted that this possibility should be prevented by a statutory pro-
vision allowing additional time for filing, if, due to false repre-
sentations of the employer, the employee should not file his claim
within the six months' period. Such a proviso would eliminate
all benefits arising from the fraud, and secure to the employee his
right to compensation.
A. A. A.
WORKxMN'S COMPENSATION - PERMAENT TOTAL DISABILITY
RATING - EFFECT OF RETURING TO WORK. - The claimant suf-
fered an injury to his right leg necessitating amputation aliout two
inches above the knee. Afterwards osteomyelitis developed in the
remaining portion of the right thigh and spread to the left fore-
arm, requiring bone surgery which resulted in permanent deform-
ity of the left forearm and wrist. The medical evidence proved
conclusively that the claimant had little use of his left 'arm; that
a slight bruise or strain thereto would probably bring about a
recurrence of the osteomyelitis; that the condition of the arm is
such that the serious reappearance of this affection would necessi-
tate surgical treatment, perhaps to the extent of amputation, and
there would be a strong likelihood that osteomyelitis would spread
to other members of the body. It was contended that a permanent
total disability award should not be granted as the claimant had
returned to work in the employer's lamp house and was receiving
wages. Held, that this employee's right to compensation on a
permanent total disability rating was not defeated by his return-
ing to work and receiving wages. Gay Coal & Coke Co. V. Work-
men's Compensation Commissioner.'
Disability results from the loss of parts of the body or the
efficient use thereof.2 The purpose of the act is to compensate the
employee for the impairment of his physical efficiency,' and in
determining the percentage of present disability the claimant's
the liability, and not of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the
right to sue at all." Keser v. U. S. S. Lead Refinery, 88 Ind. App. 246, 163
N. E. 621 (1928).
12 S. E. (2d) 265 (W. Va. 1939).
2Johnson v. Compensation Comm'r, 109 W. Va. 316, 154 S. E. 766 (1930);
2 SCoNEIDE, WoRmEN'S COmPENSATON (2d ed. 1932) 1341.
3 Ashworth v. Compensation ComIm'r, 117 W. Va. 73, 183 S. E. 912 (1936).
4
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